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Abstract 
After a brief recent empirical sketch of Islamic finance, the paper turns to its 
main theoretical and conceptual purpose.  It seeks to relate the concepts of 
Islamic and conventional finance, and to examine certain important questions 
which arise from the interaction between these systems. The paper is written 
from the perspective of conventional modern economics, as the authors are 
students of the latter.The paper discusses the main tenets of Islamic finance, as 
well as those of modern economics, including the implications of zero interest 
rates and those of Modigliani and Miller theorems. The most notable finding of 
this paper is that John Maynard Keynes’ analysis of employment, interest and 
money provides, inadvertently, the best rationale for some of the basic precepts 
of Islamic finance. The paper concludes that  there is no inevitable conflict 
between the two systems and cooperation between them is eminently desirable 
and feasible. 
JEL codes:  A10, A13, B10, B40, P4 
Keywords: Islamic finance, moral hazard, zero interest rates, Keynes and 
usuary 
 
Acknowledgements:  
The authors are grateful to Professors Eu Chye Tan and Rajah Rasiah, Dr. Kian 
Teng Kwek and other colleagues at the University of Malaya for many 
discussions and suggestions. They alone are however responsible for the views 
expressed and the errors which remain.  An earlier version of this paper was 
presented as a public lecture at the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara) on 
14th November 2011.  This is a much revised version and hence inclusion of the 
word ‘revisited’ in the title. 
 
 
 
 
 
Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the 
following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk 
 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Islamic finance has come of age.  Despite apparent serious setbacks (eg. 
interruption of payments in Abu Dhabi in 2009, the Great Recession in Western 
countries between 2008-2010 and the recent turmoil in the Middle Eastern 
countries), Islamic banking and finance have been growing at a very fast rate.  
The size of the industry which was a mere US$150 million in the 1990’s has 
increased to nearly US$1 trillion.  Although it is still a niche market and its 
share in world finance is quite small, it is nevertheless poised for further rapid 
expansion as economic development proceeds, particularly in the Muslim 
world.  Sheng (2011) estimates the current composition of Islamic finance to be 
as follows; there are roughly US$800 billion in Islamic banking funds; US$100 
billion in the ‘sukuk’ (Islamic bonds), and another US$100 billion in ‘Takaful’ 
(Islamic insurance).  According to the data recently released by Standard & 
Poor’s, in the first quarter of 2011, US$32.4 billon of Islamic bonds (`sukuk` ), 
were issued compared with US$51.2 billion raised in the whole of 2010.  The 
engine of the global market up to now has been Malaysia, which accounted for 
58 per cent of funds raised in the first quarter. 
 
However the situation may be changing with the big western banks such as 
Goldman Sachs and HSBC deciding to enter the Islamic bond market.  This is 
of course partly due to the current financial difficulties of the euro zone banks 
and conventional debt markets.   HSBC’s Middle East unit became the first 
Western bank to issue an Islamic bond (`sukuk` ) last May worth $500 million 
carrying a maturity of five years.  The French Bank Credit Agricole has said it 
is considering issuing an Islamic bond or creating a wider `sukuk`  programme 
that could lead to several issues.  However the big recent event in the Islamic 
bond market has been the controversial decision of Goldman Sachs to raise $2 
billion from this market.  The controversy is due to the fact that several Shariàh  
Law scholars have argued that the Goldman Sachs’ `sukuk`  does not meet 
requirements of the Shariàh  Law.  However the merchant bank denies the 
charge of non-compliance and appears to be sticking to its decision to go ahead 
with the ‘sukuk’ . Reuters (2012). 
 
The quick growth of Islamic finance has, however, not been a spontaneous 
event but one carefully prepared and helped by Islamic governments and their 
central banks.  The Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) has been 
in the forefront of these efforts and has assisted the growth of Islamic finance 
by the establishment of an institutional framework for a clear understanding and 
propagation of the laws of Islamic finance (see further Mirakhor 2010). This is 
no mean achievement as Islamic scholars disagree on many crucial aspects of 
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Shariàh  laws.  The Malaysian government’s chief objective has been to help 
establish regulatory and monitoring institutions that will provide an 
internationally accepted and unambiguous conception of laws relating to 
Islamic banking and financial organisations.  The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) has also been helpful in these and other respects together with a number 
of other Islamic governments (e.g. Bahrain, Sudan, Pakistan).  
Apart from the IMF, a number of non-Islamic financial centres have also 
recently taken steps to encourage Islamic banking and finance.  Tax laws have 
been revised to facilitate Shariàh compliant financial instruments such as the 
long term ‘sukuk’  bonds mentioned above.  A notable recent entrant in this 
field has been the non-Islamic centre of Singapore, which has started doing 
business in Islamic finance. A number of non-Islamic countries in Europe 
including the UK have also taken legal action to facilitate Islamic banking as 
these countries want a slice of this fast growing market.  There are, however, 
also examples of jurisdictions that have passed negative legislation, usually on 
political grounds, to prohibit the spread of Islamic finance.  This category of 
countries includes surprisingly South Korea and perhaps not so surprisingly 
some individual states in the US. 
 
The reasons for expecting fast expansion of Islamic finance lie not only in the 
increasing incomes of Islamic populations but also in the fact that the basic 
infrastructure for Islamic finance has now been laid with the establishment of 
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AOFFI), and the Islamic accounting standards authority, the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), the international Islamic financial regulatory standard-
setting organisation.  The Institute for Education in Islamic Finance (ISRA) also 
provides an invaluable website that is increasingly the transparent source for 
Shariàh interpretations on what is considered acceptable under Islamic law 
(Sheng 2011). 
 
The Islamic Finance Global Stability Report, which was jointly produced by a 
number of organisations in 2010, ‘presents a comprehensive overview of the 
global financial architecture- and the cooperation and collaboration mechanisms 
among IFSB members – needed to promote a competitive, resilient, and stable 
Islamic finance industry’.  The Islamic Financial Stability Forum that has 
resulted from this Report, and the International Islamic Liquidity Management 
(IILM), provide Islamic finance with a wider range of tools and instruments, as 
well as a road map leading toward a vision of an integrated and sound global 
Islamic financial industry.’ (Ahmed and Kohli, 2011. Pg. xxvii) 
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With the above empirical background we turn now to the main purpose of this 
paper which is theoretical and conceptual.  It seeks to relate the concepts of 
Islamic finance to those of conventional finance and to examine certain 
important economic questions which arise from the interactions between the 
two kinds of theories.  The paper is written self-consciously from the 
perspective of conventional or modern economics.1  It identifies similarities and 
dissimilarities between these two systems of thought and speculates on the 
extent to which the differences can be resolved.  The central conclusion of the 
paper is an optimistic one, namely, that each of the two paradigms of thought 
has its own strengths and weaknesses but can nevertheless coexist with the 
other without any serious difficulties. 
 
The World Bank economists Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2011) have 
recently observed that while there is a large practitional literature on Islamic 
Finance in general, and specifically Islamic banking, there are few academic 
papers. The present study is intended to help fill that gap. 
 
Organisation of the paper 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The first part, sections II and III 
will discuss the two fundamental tenets of Islamic finance, namely, (a) absolute 
prohibition of interest payments on debt, and (b) the fundamental ethical basis 
of Islamic law.  These will be examined from the perspective of modern 
economics to reach the conclusion that, although most strictures of conventional 
academic economists as well as the business press against the Islamic paradigm 
are inaccurate, some are still relevant.  Importantly, this part of the paper 
suggests that the best rationale for the Islamic injunction against interest rates is 
provided by John Maynard Keynes (1936) in his magnum opus, The General 
Theory, although his analysis was not directly concerned with issues of Islamic 
finance.  These sections also pay particular attention to the concept of cost-
benefit analysis (CBA), widely used in both theoretical and applied 
conventional economics.  We discuss the compatibility of the rates of discount 
normally used in such analyses with Shariàh law.  
 
Further, an examination of other issues, in this part of the paper, highlights the 
moral hazards faced by Islamic depositors as well as by their banks.  These 
moral hazard problems apply to both Islamic and non-Islamic finance and that 
avoidance of moral hazard would depend on the effectiveness of the 
disciplinarian function of bank risk management, financial regulation, the 
bankruptcy courts and also the ethics of the key players in each system.  Since 
these may have differences in practice in different countries, it is not possible in 
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principle to argue that one system is more effective in moral hazard avoidance 
than the other.  
 
From the two basic tenets of Islamic economics the second part of the paper 
will go on to consider in sections IV, V and VI the important relevant tenets of 
modern economics: (a) the so called Modigliani and Miller (MM) theorems and 
their implications for optimal capital structure of Islamic banks and firms, (b) 
the role of the concept of bankruptcy, its costs and who pays the main costs, and 
their consequences for moral hazard for Islamic and non-Islamic finance and, 
(c) a brief examination of the role of stock markets in Islamic finance.  A final  
section will summarise the main findings of the paper and provide a brief 
conclusion. 
 
At the risk of repetition, to provide additional clarity to the issues outlined 
above, they are elaborated further below.  
 
1. In view of the absolute prohibition in Islamic finance to pay any kind of 
interest on debt, an important question is whether or not it is possible to 
run efficiently an economic system which does not have a key role for 
interest rates?  
 
2. What role do interest rates play in conventional economics at a 
theoretical level and in practical terms? Can other variables substitute for 
interest rates in alternative economic systems? 
 
3. In the discussion of the method of cost-benefit analysis, are the discount 
rates which are normally used in such exercises compatible with the 
tenets of Islamic finance? 
 
4. Why and to what degree are the households, firms and banks involved in 
Islamic finance vulnerable to moral hazard? The concept of bankruptcy, 
its costs for contracting parties under the two systems and their 
relationship with moral hazard will be analysed. 
 
5. What are the implications of MM theorems for Islamic banks and firms? 
Is there an optimal debt-equity ratio for these institutions? 
 
6. What, if any, should be the role of the stock market in Islamic finance?   
 
Although this commentary on Islamic concepts is based on modern economic 
analysis, it fully acknowledges the contributions of the great contemporary 
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Islamic economic scholars, including among others, Professors Abbas 
Mirakhor, Mohshin Khan, Ahmed Ali Saddiqui and the eminent late IMF 
economist Dr. V. Sundararajan. This paper builds as much on the work of these 
scholars as on that of conventional economists. 
 
2. Central Tenet of Islamic Finance: Absolute Prohibition against Interest 
Rates  
In the 1970s when the subject of Islamic finance was first raised in a serious 
way, its central tenet of the absolute prohibition of interest payments on debt 
was severely criticised by mainstream economists.  It was alleged that such a 
prohibition was incompatible with modern economic analysis and would result 
in a gross misallocation of resources.  It was dubbed as a zero interest system in 
which there was no return to capital. Professor Mirakhor (2009) reports that the 
BBC and the Wall Street Journal regarded the system as being totally non-
viable and derived from ‘voodoo’ economics. 
 
Apart from these popular criticisms of Islamic injunctions against any interest 
payments, there were also serious academic objections. Professor Mirakhor 
(2010) summarises below the main points of these criticisms: -  
 
that zero interest meant infinite demand for loanable funds and zero supply; 
 
such a system would be incapable of equilibrating demand for and supply of 
loanable funds; 
 
with zero interest rate there would be no savings; 
 
this meant no investment and no growth; 
 
in this system, there could be no monetary policy since no instruments of 
liquidity management could exist without a fixed predetermined rate of 
interest; and, finally, 
 
this all meant that in countries adopting such a system there would be 
one way capital flight.   
 
It should be noted that ironically all the above criticisms would also today apply 
to countries that practice Zero Interest Rate Policies (ZIRP) under quantitative 
easing.  
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Cost Benefit Analysis, Time Preference and Shariàh Law 
 
In contrast with Islamic economic analysis, conventional economists widely use 
the notion of interest rates in their work.  In terms of their paradigm they have 
legitimate use of zero interest rates, negative interest rates as well as positive 
interest rates in examining real world economies.  To illustrate with a difficult 
case, one commonly used concept in both theoretical and applied conventional 
economics is that of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of a project, or of a 
development policy, or the choice of a particular technique of production.  To 
take a simple specific example of a project to build, say a bridge across a river, 
the CBA would involve estimating the time series of respective costs and 
benefits which will accrue during the time span of the project.  The costs and 
benefits would normally differ not only in their magnitudes but more 
importantly also in their respective time profiles.  In order to assess whether the 
proposed project is viable, one needs to systematically compare the two time 
series.  This is done in CBA by taking the net present value of each of the series 
– the latter being determined by deflation by a common rate of discount.  This 
rate of discount which is normally taken to be the market interest rate is 
supposed to reflect the society’s preference between consumption or utility 
today and consumption or utility tomorrow.  If the two are equally valued, this 
may be regarded as the case of Islamic finance with a zero discount or interest 
rate.  
 
Interestingly, in conventional economics in the classic work of Pigou (1920) 
and Ramsey (1928) on this subject, it is also strongly argued that this time 
preference should be zero, the purpose in this case being the achievement of 
intergenerational fairness.  A positive discount rate or interest rate would 
greatly favour the current generation against future generations. Pigou 
considered it as ethically wrong to discount future consumption or utility just 
because it takes place in the future. He argued that discounting was basically 
due to myopic behaviour. Pigou and Ramsey took the view that a zero rate of 
discount would promote equity by preventing the present generation from 
acting selfishly. They regarded a non-zero rate of discount necessarily implied 
an unfair advantage for the present generation. 
 
Thus we find that Pigou and Ramsey’s ethical judgements coincided with those 
of Islamic finance on this particular issue. However, there is a more significant 
argument in favour of a non-zero discount rate or a positive time preference 
which is based on the fact that the society tomorrow is likely to be richer than it 
is today because of economic growth. In these circumstances a social rate of 
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time preference has a sound ethical justification. Summarising a huge literature 
on optimal growth theory Marini and Scaramozzino (1999) rightly note: 
 
Under endogenous productivity growth, the optimal social discount rate must be equal 
to the marginal social product of capital……Positive social time preference, far from 
discriminating against future generations, is essential for an equitable inter-temporal 
allocation of resources. 
 
 It is a moot point whether a non-zero discount rate in CBA accords with 
Shariàh law. Nevertheless, it may be useful to observe that the non-zero 
discount rate arises here entirely from the fact of greater production in the 
following time periods. Therefore, it is different from the case of money earning 
interest without any effort. Here the non-zero rate is associated with economic 
growth. 
 
Interest Rates, Savings and Financial Liberalisation 
 
Another, this time a more straightforward, example of the use of positive 
interest rates in conventional economics is provided by the work of McKinnon 
(1973) and Shaw (1973) which has played a major role in financial 
liberalisation in developing countries since the 1970s. In this research, high 
interest rates are viewed extremely positively. As this work of the so-called 
‘Stanford School’ has had a wide impact, it will be useful to examine it a little 
more fully.  Writing in the 1970s, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) attributed 
the poor performance of investment and growth in developing countries to 
‘financial repression’, as expressed in interest rate ceilings, high reserve ratios, 
and directed credit programmes. 
 
The Stanford economists, therefore, argued strongly in favour of financial ‘de-
repression’. They suggested that the liberalisation of the financial system would 
lead to higher interest rates and thereby to greater savings, greater magnitude as 
well as quality of investments and to growth. This work is, however, 
controversial and its conclusions are contrary to much mainstream economics as 
well as those of Islamic finance.2  
 
The main testable hypotheses of the Stanford economists were (1) high interest 
rates would yield higher savings; (2) higher savings would lead to higher 
investment; (3) it will also improve the productivity of investment and thereby 
lead to faster growth. 
 
All these assertions are debatable both at a theoretical level as well as 
empirically.  It is not our purpose here to provide a detailed analysis of these 
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propositions.  Suffice to say, very briefly, that in the mainstream, the Keynesian 
economists in particular, contest the McKinnon and Shaw hypotheses on the 
ground that their underlying model assumes that savings determine investment. 
Savings are, however, done by one kind of economic agents (individuals and 
households), and investments are carried out by other groups such as firms and 
entrepreneurs. The different kinds of agents have different motivations and 
there is no reason why savings should determine investment.  Critics also point 
out that McKinnon and Shaw assume there is always full employment of 
resources.  Moreover, they suggest that whether or not higher interest rates in 
the formal sector following liberalization will increase aggregate savings 
depends on the savings behaviour of the losers and gainers from this process.  
To the extent that the personal sector finances the investments of the corporate 
sector, which in developing countries are often highly geared, higher interest 
rates may reduce corporate profits and retained earnings.  The central point is 
that, although the rise in interest rates will increase personal incomes, if the 
savings propensity of the personal sector is lower than that of the corporate 
sector (which is likely), it will lead to a fall in total savings (Akyuz, 1991). 
 
More importantly, whether for the above reasons or others, empirical evidence 
from many countries, particularly Asian countries, which liberalized their credit 
markets in the 1980s and 1990s and increased real interest rates did not indicate 
a systematic rise in aggregate savings.  As Cho and Khatkhate (1989) noted in 
their influential analysis of the financial liberalization experience of five Asian 
countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka):  
 
It was believed that the removal of the repressive policies would boost saving.  The 
survey in this paper of the consequences of reforms does not reveal any systematic 
trend or pattern in regard to saving (and also investment), though it clearly 
demonstrates that reform has greatly contributed to the financialization of savings.  In 
most of these countries, savings changed in a random fashion. 
 
Akyuz (1991) reached the same conclusion with respect to aggregate savings in 
relation to Turkey’s liberalization experiment during the late 1970s and in the 
1980s. 
 
As for the effects of credit market liberalization on the efficiency of the 
investment allocation process, leaving aside the disastrous consequences of 
such liberalization in the Southern Cone countries in the 1970s, many 
successful economies have used subsidies – indeed negative interest rates – for 
long periods of time as an important part of their industrial policies during the 
course of economic development.  This has certainly been true of Japan, which 
provided negative real interest rates to its favoured corporations for much of the 
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post-war period of its most rapid industrialization (1950 to 1973).  Thus Sachs 
(1985) notes in relation to Japan: 
 
Domestic capital markets were highly regulated and completely shut off from world 
capital markets.  The government was the only sector with access to international 
borrowing and lending.  Foreign direct investment was heavily circumscribed, with 
majority ownership by foreign firms both legally and administratively barred.  During 
the early to mid-1950s, about a third of external funds for industrial investment 
originated in loans from government financial institutions, at preferential rates that 
varied across firms and industries.  These state financial institutions remained an 
important source of cheap financing until the 1960s. 
 
As Amsden (1990) pointed out, subsidies and directed credit were also central 
features of the Republic of Korea’s highly successful industrial policy during 
the previous two decades. 
 
To sum up there is enough evidence to indicate that, contrary to the Stanford 
school, a high-interest rate policy based on financial de-repression was 
apparently not regarded as being suitable by many developing countries.  The 
most successful economies in East Asia did not follow such policies.  Policy-
makers in developing countries ordinarily try to maintain low interest rates in 
order to encourage investment and growth.  In that sense, there is unlikely to be 
much difference at a practical level in the performance of Islamic and non-
Islamic countries in the real world.  However, at a conceptual level, the 
difference between the two paradigms is huge. Islamic scholars do not find any 
justification for positive interest rates (see, however, below). Nevertheless, the 
fundamental flaw in the mainstream strictures against the zero interest rate 
policy of Islamic finance was that it failed to take into account the fact that 
although the policy did not reward financial investment with interest payments, 
profits on capital and enterprise were fully allowed, and indeed encouraged. 
Finally, in addition to zero and positive interest rates, conventional economics 
also employs negative interest rates. These often arise from the government’s 
industrial policy where the government wishes to encourage certain industries 
and is therefore willing to ‘socialise’ the risks involved for the individual firm; 
in other words the government subsidises the relevant activities of the firm. 
 
Keynes and Zero Interest Rates 
 
As indicated in the section above, the Stanford school expectation that high 
interest rates would generate high savings and investments is not only 
incompatible with empirical evidence but is also regarded as being theoretically  
erroneous by many modern economists. Most significantly, in the context of 
this paper, John Maynard Keynes in his magnum opus, the General Theory of 
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Employment, Interest and Money (Keynes, 1936), provided a powerful defence 
of zero interest rates and condemned usury, historic or contemporary.  Usury 
was strongly opposed both by Islam and the Christian Church in medieval 
Europe and elsewhere.  Although he did not set out to do so, Keynes’ analysis, 
in our view, provides the best rationale for some of the basic principles of 
Islamic Finance. In the General Theory, Keynes wrote: 
 
There remains an allied, but distinct, matter where for centuries, indeed for several 
millenniums, enlightened opinion held for certain and obvious a doctrine which the 
classical school has repudiated as childish, but which deserves rehabilitation and 
honour. I mean the doctrine that the rate of interest is not self-adjusting at a level best 
suited to the social advantage but constantly tends to rise too high, so that a wise 
Government is concerned to curb it by statute and custom and even by invoking the 
sanctions of the moral law. (p. 351) 
 
Keynes went on to observe: 
 
Provisions against usury are amongst the most ancient economic practices of which we 
have record. The destruction of the inducement to invest by an excessive liquidity-
preference was the outstanding evil, the prime impediment to the growth of wealth, in 
the ancient and medieval worlds. And naturally so, since certain of the risks and 
hazards of economic life diminish the marginal efficiency of capital while others serve 
to increase the preference for liquidity. In a world, therefore, which no one  reckoned to 
be safe, it was almost inevitable that the rate of interest, unless it was curbed by every 
instrument at the disposal of society, would rise too high to permit of an adequate 
inducement to invest. (p. 351) 
 
Thus, Keynes made common cause with Christian scholars and the medieval 
church in denouncing usury and raised issues with those modern economists 
(the neo-classicals) who believed that free markets would automatically 
generate interest rates which will ensure full employment.  In the context of the 
economic problems of his day, Keynes thought that it was evident that the 
market magic was not working.  A non-market but low or zero interest rate was 
therefore the right policy stance.  
 
Keynes believed that only a very low or zero interest rate could ensure 
continuous full employment in a modern economy. From a Keynesian 
perspective there are two essential issues concerning the determination of 
interest rates and employment.  The first is the question of the level of interest 
rates and the second is the issue of marginal efficiency of capital.  It is 
important to note in the context of this paper that Islamic Finance addresses 
both these concerns.  By religious injunction interests rates are kept at zero and 
at the same time Islamic laws encourage circulation of money rather than 
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keeping it locked up and unused.  Islamic Finance, indeed, encourages the union 
of capital and enterprise in order to meet the society’s needs.  
 
Keynes also opposed high interest rates on the grounds of equity.  He wrote: 
 
The justification for a moderately high rate of interest has been found hitherto in the 
necessity of providing a sufficient inducement to save.  But we have shown that the 
extent of effective saving is necessarily determined by the scale of investment and that 
the scale of investment is promoted by a low rate of interest, provided that we do not 
attempt to stimulate it in this way beyond the point which corresponds to full 
employment. (p. 375, emphasis in the original) 
 
Keynes noted further: 
 
Interest today rewards no genuine sacrifice any more than does the rent of land.  The 
owner of capital can obtain interest because capital is scarce, just as the owner of land 
can obtain rent because land is scarce.  But whilst there may be intrinsic reasons for the 
scarcity of land there are no intrinsic reasons for the scarcity of capital.  (p. 376) 
 
Minsky (1975) provides a valuable analysis of Keynes’ thinking on these 
matters concerning full employment and more equal distribution of income. 
Minsky argues: 
 
Keynes’ vision that the euthanasia of the rentier, as a necessary outgrowth of the 
accumulation process, will radically decrease, if not eliminate, income from the 
ownership of scarce capital resources requires the prior achievement of a state of 
disciplined wants, a stable population, and a lifting of the burdens of war. None of 
these conditions have been fully satisfied – and of these conditions, it may well be that 
the disciplined–wants requirement is furthest from sight. 
 Keynes advanced two reasons why capital income should and would decrease as a 
proportion of total income. There was no need for high incomes to decrease the 
propensity to consume. In fact, a low propensity to consume is counterproductive, for 
it decreases the inducement to invest. Furthermore, in a short space of time, full 
investment could be achieved if full employment were maintained and if wants were 
disciplined. Once such full investment had been achieved then a new social order 
could emerge, for 
All kinds of social customs and economic practices, affecting the distribution of 
wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we now maintain at all costs, 
however distasteful and unjust they may be in themselves, because they are 
tremendously useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall then be free, 
at last, to discard.(Keynes pp 155-156) 
 
In order to put Keynes’s analysis of usury in perspective it may be interesting to 
see how modern economic historians view this phenomenal. Rubin (2011) 
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provides an alternative interpretation to the conventional ones regarding the 
incidence and magnitude of usury over the ages and spells out its implications 
for underdevelopment of the Muslim world compared to the Christian world. 
Rubin’s basic argument is that the political authorities of the Muslim world 
required more help from the religious authorities in order to legitimize their 
regime. He puts this forward as a main explanation of why the Islamic usury 
laws were more stringent than those of Christianity in the Middle Ages although 
before 1000 AD it was the other way around. Only time and further research 
will tell whether Rubin’s analysis is valid. We note, however, that Rubin 
regards any freedom to practice usury as a positive aspect without considering 
the negative aspects which Keynes outlined above. He does not call attention 
either to the question of marginal efficiency of investment or the relationship 
between the latter and interest rates. 
 
Another distinguished economic historian of the Middle East is Professor Timur 
Kuran. In his recent book (Kuran, 2011), he suggests that the reason for the 
success of the Europeans and the decline of Islam since the Middle Ages has 
been due to the institutional deficits of the latter. These deficits have resulted in 
the Muslim world not being able to adopt institutions which facilitated 
accumulation of capital and impersonal exchange. Capital accumulation was 
also handicapped by the redistributive character of Islamic inheritance laws. In 
contrast Western Europe institutional development encouraged both impersonal 
exchange and capital accumulates.  
 
Contrary to Kuran, the Harvard economic historian Chaney (2011) suggests that 
in the final analysis it was the Middle East’s political equilibrium – not Islamic 
law – that held back the region.  He argues that ‘Islamic law as interpreted in 
each period by Muslim religious leaders may have been largely endogenous to 
the incentives and constraints this group faced. Had the Middle East’s political 
equilibrium changed, the religious leaders’ interpretation of Islamic law would 
have also changed. Alternatively, these leaders could have lost political power 
and Islamic law might have ceased to be enforced’ (pp. 1469). 
 
Economic System and Usury: A Summing-up 
 
From the historical perspective on usury, we take up further analytical issues 
concerning the role of interest rates and their abolition in diverse economic 
systems. An economic system where the capital is rewarded according to its 
earning capacity could be entirely adequate for achieving sufficient savings and 
investments for economic growth, and for allocating them efficiently.  The main 
proposition of Islamic finance is that the return to capital is determined ex-post 
 13 
 
and would be based on the return to economic activity in which the capital was 
employed.  Savings and investment would be determined by this ex-post rate of 
return on capital. Indeed, subsequent research showed that the Islamic system 
can be based entirely on equity capital, without debt, and is therefore often more 
stable than the conventional system based on debt.  This question will be 
discussed further in section IV where the Modigliani and Miller theorems and 
their implications for optimal financial structure for firms will be analysed. 
This discussion raises an important question for conventional economists, 
whether an economic system requires an ex-ante interest rate to function 
efficiently.  Here, Professor Mirakhor (2011) has reminded us that the Arrow-
Debreu-Hahn system of general equilibrium, together with its welfare properties 
does not have an ex-ante interest rate in the analysis.  This system is totally 
viable and is indeed the crowning glory of modern economics.  Adding an extra 
variable such as the interest rate would over-determine the system and will be 
difficult to interpret. See also Milgate (forthcoming). 
 
It is also interesting to note that because there is competition between 
conventional investors and investors in Islamic banks there is not likely to be 
much difference in the rates of return (interest in the case of conventional banks 
and share of profits in the case of retail Islamic profit and loss sharing (PLS) 
accounts) earned by the two groups.  This hypothesis is confirmed by a recent 
IMF study which compares the rate of return from the two kinds of banking 
institutions in Malaysia and Turkey over the period January 1997 to August 
2010 (see Çevik and Charap 2011). 
 
The data revealed, as expected, a high degree of correlation between 
conventional deposit rates and the rate of return on retail PLS accounts in 
Malaysia and Turkey. Between January 1997 and August 2010, a correlation of 
one year term conventional bank deposit rates and a rate of return for PLS 
accounts was 91 per cent for Malaysia and 92 per cent for Turkey.  The 
econometric result show strong evidence of co-integration between 
conventional bank deposit rates and PLS returns over the long term. Granger 
causality is found between conventional deposit rates and the rate of return on 
PLS accounts both in levels and first differences.  An important result based on 
pair wise Granger causality tests indicate that the null hypothesis that changes 
in PLS returns do not Granger cause changes in conventional deposit rates both 
in Malaysia and Turkey cannot be rejected, but the null hypothesis that changes 
in conventional deposit rates do not Granger cause changes in PLS returns can 
be rejected.  The authors also use error correction methodology and find that 
causality tests confirm the findings based on pairwise Granger causality tests 
(Çevik and Cherap, 2011). 
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Thus, in broad terms an Islamic banking system is an essentially equity-based 
system in which depositors are treated as if they are shareholders of the bank.  
There is thus no fixed payment to the depositors for their money but they are 
entitled to a share of the profits of the bank.  In this equity based system, 
corporate governance is rather different than in the conventional system.  It will 
be argued below that this leads to problems of moral hazard for the Islamic 
bank.  It will be suggested further that the redistributive stance of Islamic laws 
leads to the problems of moral hazard for the depositor. This requires either 
strong ethics or very strong regulation, or both for the resolution of these 
difficulties. 
 
In view of their significance for the theory and empirics of Islamic Finance 
these points will be examined more fully in the next section. 
 
3. Ethical foundations of Islamic finance 
Although the rejection of interest payments is an essential element of Islamic 
finance, the foundations of the latter lie in certain ethical principles which in 
turn emanate from Quran Sunnah and legal and ethical reasoning of Shariàh 
scholars. These in their entirety constitute the basis for Islamic finance.  Ethical 
principles guiding Islamic finance include significantly: ‘the avoidance of 
Gharar: The concept applies to preventable ambiguity and uncertainty,’ Ahmed 
and Kohli (2011).  Principles of Islamic finance are implemented through 
contracts.  Shariàh law covers conditions of contract and inter-alia rights and 
freedoms of the contracting parties. 
 
Importantly there is a strong redistributive element in Islamic finance. As 
Professor Mirakhor notes in the conventional system, ‘rich help the poor as a 
demonstration of sympathy, beneficence, benevolence and charity.  In Islam, 
the more able are required to share the consequences of the materialization of 
idiosyncratic risks – illness, bankruptcy, disability, accidents and socio-
economic disadvantaged – for those who are unable to provide for themselves. 
The economically well off are commanded to share risks of those who are 
economically unable to use the instruments of Islamic finance. In Islamic 
finance, the risks that would face the future generations are shared by the 
present generation through the rules of inheritance.  These rules break up the 
accumulated wealth as it passes from one generation to another to enable 
sharing risks of a larger number of people,’ Mirakhor (2011, p-15).  
 
To illustrate with a simple example from an element of the Islamic banking 
code, consider the case of a mortgagee with an Islamic bank.  In Islamic finance 
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the normal mortgage contract carries an implicit and explicit assurance that if 
the mortgagee is unable to pay his mortgage, the contract will entitle him for 
help from the Bank. 
Some economists argue that this will create a moral hazard for the mortgagee.  
However, opinions differ.  Other scholars suggest that if the mortgagee does not 
obey the Islamic ethical code outlined above he or she will be subject to severe 
sanctions from members of the community.  Similarly Khan and Mirakhor 
(1993) argue that the Banks have direct and indirect control over the agent-
entrepreneurs through both explicit and implicit contracts.  This is the case 
because banks could refuse further credit or blacklist the agent-entrepreneur and 
put at stake his/ her credibility and respectability.  This brings in a strong 
deterrent to irresponsible behaviour.  However Sundararajan (2011) observes 
that this argument does not change the fact that the bank has no legal means to 
intervene in the management of the current enterprise while it is done by the 
agent entrepreneur. 
 
To the mainstream economist, it seems very unlikely that adherents of Islamic 
finance will be able to live up to such high moral standards.  Conventional 
economics invariably assumes that human beings are selfish and analyses their 
activities on the basis of that postulate.  If the same assumption of selfishness is 
made in relation to the participants in Islamic finance it will lead to a huge 
moral hazard problem on the side of the debtor.  
 
There is similarly possibility of moral hazard on the side of the Bank.  This 
arises from the unrestricted Mudaraba contract where the bank manages the 
deposits at its own discretion.  This increases the moral hazard for a bank as it 
may indulge in more risk taking, without adequate capital.  As Sundararajan 
(2011) notes, investment depositors in Islamic Banks do not enjoy the same 
rights as equity investors in conventional investment companies but do share the 
same risks.   
 
For these reasons, Islamic finance poses considerable pressure on the Islamic 
Finance management to manage their investment risks to avoid moral hazard.  It 
also poses considerable pressure on the financial regulators to monitor 
investment and agency (bank intermediary) behaviour to avoid passing all risks 
ultimately to the depositor.  A third unknown factor is the certainty of the 
Shariàh  bankruptcy courts to enforce disputes over contracts that show clear 
signs of moral hazard (or shirking by borrower/investee to avoid his 
repayments). 
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Table 1 in the appendix outlines the main differences between Islamic and non-
Islamic banks.  The most recent empirical research by the World Bank 
economists, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2010), referred to earlier, 
suggests that conventional and Islamic banking are more alike than previously 
thought.   
 
Differences in business models – if they exist at all – do not show in standard indicators 
based on financial statements information.  Other differences, such as cost efficiency, seem to 
be driven more by country rather than by bank type differences.  Finally, the good 
performance of Islamic banks during the recent crisis appears to be driven by higher 
precaution in liquidity holdings an capitalization, but no inherent difference in asset quality 
between the two bank types, . .’ (p.3)   
 
Although based on rather different data and a different definition of the 
analytical problem, the World Bank economists’ conclusions from their 
empirical study support the findings of the IMF economists, Çevik and Cherap, 
as discussed in the previous section. 
 
Although as noted in section 1, Islamic finance has expanded very fast, it still 
has a small share of world finance and is still in a niche market Tan (2009).  
Some respected commentators argue that the market has concentrated on the 
development of safe, short-term financial instruments and ignored the long-term 
market.  It is feared by these scholars that because of path dependency which is 
characteristic of many economic events, the Islamic finance industry may 
simply continue to operate on the short end of the market.  Indeed, these well-
wishers of Islamic finance would like to take a major step forward and develop 
an Islamic stock market for meeting the needs of the Islamic investors for 
investments with long-term horizons.  This important question will be examined 
in detail in section 5. 
 
 4.   Modigliani and Miller Theorems 
Having examined the two basic tenets of Islamic finance we shall now move on 
in the second part of the paper to consider a fundamental tenet of modern 
economics, namely the so called Modigliani and Miller (MM) Theorems 
concerning the optimal financial structure of firms.  We shall also analyse the 
feasibility and desirability of establishing stock markets on Islamic rules to 
assist the growth of Islamic finance. 
 
Since the late 1950s and until recently, the modern neo-classical view of finance 
has been dominated by the so-called ‘irrelevance theorems’ associated with 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961).  In seminal contributions, starting with 
their pioneering 1958 paper, Modigliani and Miller put forward two central 
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propositions about the theory of finance.  They showed that in fully developed 
capital markets, under fully idealised neo-classical assumptions of perfect 
competition, no transaction costs, no taxation and no bankruptcy, even in a 
world of uncertainty, the stock-market valuation of the firm is independent of its 
financing or dividend pay-out decisions. On the basis of certain further 
restrictive assumptions about expectations and the nature of uncertainty (e.g. 
uniformity in expectations held by all investors on the stock-market), it was 
established that the market would value the firm’s shares entirely on the basis of 
its earnings prospects; share prices would be invariant to the capital structure of 
the firm or to the extent to which it resorts to internal or external sources to 
finance its investment plans.  
 
Miller (1991) provides an intuitive explanation for the MM theorems with the 
help of an analogy. ‘Think of the firm as a gigantic tub of whole milk. The 
farmer can sell the whole milk as it is. Or he can separate out the cream, and sell 
it at a considerably higher price than the whole milk would bring. The 
Modigliani-Miller proposition says that if there were no costs of separation, 
(and, of course, no government dairy support programme), the cream plus the 
skim milk would bring the same price as the whole milk.’  Vallimil further 
elaborates on this explanation in the following terms: ‘…the essence of the 
argument is that increasing the amount of debt (cream) lowers the value of 
outstanding equity (skim milk) – selling of safe cash flows to debt-holders 
leaves the firm with more lower valued equity, keeping the total value on the 
firm unchanged. Put differently, any gain from using more of what might seem 
to be cheaper debt is offset by the higher cost of now riskier equity. Hence, 
given a fixed amount of total capital, the allocation of capital between debt and 
equity is irrelevant because the weighted average of the two costs of capital to 
the firm is the same for all possible combinations of the two.’  
 
At a deeper level, the Modigliani and Miller theorems suggested a dichotomy 
between finance and the real economy: corporate growth and investment 
decisions were dictated completely by ‘real’ variables such as productivity, 
demand for output, technical progress and relative factor prices of capital and 
labour.  Finance in this paradigm is always permissive and simply facilitates the 
investment process. 
 
As in the case of neoclassical economics, the normal Keynesian perspective on 
the role of finance in investment and economic growth also assumes well-
developed capital markets.  However, this perspective does not postulate perfect 
capital markets in the sense that the relevant information on costs, reliability 
and other aspects of the transaction, is not available on equal terms to all the 
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participants in the market.  According to the Keynesian view, corporate 
investment is essentially determined by ‘animal spirits’, by businessmen’s 
confidence, by expected demand and by the cost of capital.  The latter variable 
in practice is regarded as being relatively insignificant compared with demand 
factors.  
 
As they do not accept the assumption of perfect capital markets, Keynesian 
economists do not generally believe that the Modigliani and Miller propositions 
are operational in the real world.  These neo-classical irrelevance theorems also 
run contrary to the traditional conception of a firm’s investment and financing 
decisions. The traditional view was a so-called ‘pecking order’ theory of 
finance (Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984 and 1985; Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Peterson, 1988), which suggested that firms always preferred internal to 
external finance and, if they had to use external finance, they would prefer to 
employ debt and  only as a last resort, equity finance.  The firm’s capital 
structure and its dividend pay-out decisions, in this analysis, were important 
variables which had an independent influence on its share price.  More 
generally, the non-availability of the appropriate kind of finance could constrain 
a firm’s growth or investment plans: this suggestion was often incorporated in 
the post-war microeconomic investment models in the Keynesian spirit.  Mayer 
and Kuh (1957) and Mayer and Glaüber (1964) are classic references. These 
issues have been carefully examined in Stiglitz (1998 and 2005). 
 
Paradoxically, the above traditional theory of finance has been resurrected and 
revalidated by a number of theoretical developments in the last two decades 
which attempt to relax some of the highly restrictive assumptions of the 
Modigliani and Miller propositions.  With respect to the latter, it was noted at 
the simplest level that if taxation and possibility of bankruptcy and financial 
distress are introduced into the analysis, this would produce an optimal capital 
structure for the firm and thus invalidate the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance 
theorems.  Many corporate tax systems, for example, allow interest to be 
deducted as costs, which provides a significant tax advantage in the use of debt 
finance.  There is, however, a trade-off, since too high a level of debt increases 
the risks of bankruptcy or financial distress in an economic downturn.  This 
simple trade-off model leads to an optimal debt-equity ratio for the firm, which 
maximizes its stock-market valuation. 
 
More complex considerations and theoretical developments involving 
asymmetric information between insiders (managers) and outsiders (creditors or 
shareholders), problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, agency costs, 
signalling and transaction costs lead to different costs of the various forms of 
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finance but can be shown to be broadly compatible with the ‘pecking order’ 
type theory outlined above (The classic reference here is Myers and Majluf, 
1984).  In general, this far richer and more complete analysis of the issues 
points to the significance of the corporate capital structures and the financial 
decisions for the real economy.  At the very least, the new models of the firm 
suggest that ‘finance’ is not simply a veil, but that there are very important 
interactions between corporate finance and the real economy.  Thus, unlike the 
neo-classical investment models (see in particular the widely acknowledged and 
valued contributions by Jorgensen and his colleagues) which dominated the 
profession in the 1960s and 1970s, many economists subsequently in the light 
of the new interpretation of MM Theorems, particularly the post-Keynesian 
ones, came to regard ‘cashflow’ and corporate retained earnings as being a 
significant constraint on a firm’s investment decisions. 
 
However our main concern in this paper is not so much with corporate 
investment decisions, but with the question of the financial structures of Islamic 
and non-Islamic firms.  Stiglitz (1988) has observed that under ‘very general 
conditions if there is no chance of bankruptcy then financial policy has no effect 
on the value of the firm; there is no optimal debt-equity ratio.’  This suggests 
that under the neo-classical assumptions of MM Theorems, any financial 
structure for Islamic firms is optimal, including that of all equity and no debt.  
However, if these strict assumptions are relaxed, particularly when there is a 
real possibility of bankruptcy, the firm valuation will depend on its debt-equity 
ratio.  Thus, for any specific firm there will be a corresponding optimal debt-
equity ratio.  There is no reason to believe that Islamic firms would attempt to 
achieve or would have achieved their respective optimum financial structures in 
terms of debt-equity ratios.  Does this make Islamic firms less efficient?  The 
answer is not necessarily so because the question of optimality in the above 
analysis is considered only from the perspective of an individual firm and not 
from that of society as a whole.  Suppose all Islamic firms are 100% equity 
financed.  This may violate the results of the optimality tests of the MM 
Theorems, but from the point of view of the society as a whole such a capital 
structure may have considerable macro-economic benefits, such as more stable 
GDP growth. 
 
The fundamental point is that if all Islamic Finance contracts are equity 
contracts, then it is vital for the banks to ensure that the investee/borrower is not 
too highly leveraged.  The higher the leverage of the borrower, the higher the 
risks assumed by the IF investor.  By definition, the lower the leverage of the 
borrower, the safer the financial system is on the whole.   
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5.  Risk Sharing, Risk Shifting, and the Risks of Bankruptcy  
From the perspective of conventional economics, there is however another way 
of interpreting the differences between the Islamic (IF) and non-Islamic 
borrowing individuals and firms as well as the lending banks.  This involves the 
question of the relative costs and efficacy of bankruptcy in the two systems.  So 
it is not just a matter of whether or not there is provision for bankruptcy or 
insolvency in a model of corporate finance but what are its costs and who is 
expected to bear them, in law and in practice. 
 
In terms of conventional finance, the real issues are those of information 
asymmetry, principal-agent (contract) and insolvency.  Conventional finance 
assumes that you can shift the risks between two parties based upon contract.  In 
Islamic Finance, one starts with risk-sharing between the borrower and the 
bank.  But in all contracts, there is an inherent information asymmetry when the 
borrower or investee do not know when they will enter economic insolvency 
(this being dependent on whether banks are willing to lend and the rate of 
interest).  Most companies that are in trouble may be accounting-wise still 
solvent, but economically insolvent, depending on the mark-to-market price of 
assets, which also depends on the rate of discount.  In other words, the company 
may not know (and neither does the Islamic Finance institution know), when it 
becomes insolvent.   When the company becomes insolvent, the losses are 
automatically shared amongst its shareholders and holders of its obligations.   
 
Hence, there is essentially no difference between the non-Islamic finance lender 
and Islamic equity contract in these respects.  The conventional lender protects 
his own risks and shifts these by contracting with the borrower, to include 
collateral and guarantees.  If however, the real interest rate rises, the DCF value 
of the borrower’s assets decline and real value of liabilities increase and he may 
go into economic insolvency.  At the same time, the collateral value of the 
lender’s holdings of collateral also declines, (especially if they are land or 
equity).  Thus, at higher real rates of interest, especially during a crisis, the 
borrower moves into economic insolvency and therefore (non-transparently) 
transfers the insolvency risk to the lenders and holders of his paper.  This risk-
reversion is identical in form for IF or non-IF firms.  
 
There is a further cost of bankruptcy (transactions cost in time, legal fees etc.) 
which the borrower or investor may have to invest in so as to recoup their loan 
or investment.  Thus, if both IF and non-IF contracts involve involuntary risk-
sharing, then the only real distinguishing feature between the two systems is 
whether the bankruptcy laws are strong enough and efficient enough for 
enforcement.  
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In the IF contract, there is a moral or non-temporal sanction on the borrower, 
hoping that this ‘soft power’ will be more effective than ‘hard power - legal or 
other means of enforcement’ to force the borrower to repay.  The reason is that 
there is information asymmetry between the borrower’s true solvency and the 
lender/investor.  The borrower may engage in lying or hiding his true solvency 
in order to pass as much losses as possible to the lender and/or investor.  We 
cannot judge a priori whether IF’s soft power is necessarily better than the legal 
power of debt enforcement.  This depends on the circumstances of the case, the 
legal powers in a country, and the effectiveness of the courts etc. 
 
To put it clearly, all debt or risk-sharing contracts suffer from moral hazard.  If 
they are not enforced against cheating or free-riding, then risks will pass to the 
solvency holder/lender.  In simple utility terms, when the marginal benefit to 
the borrower is higher than the cost of sanctions, then he will not pay.  An 
important question is therefore whether sanctions are real enough for the 
borrowers to make the necessary adjustments so that if they cannot pay today, 
they shall at least pay tomorrow.  
 
It is arguable that the costs of bankruptcy to the borrowers in terms of 
conventional finance are lower for the IF borrower than for the non-IF 
borrower.  In the case of the latter there are not only the laws relating to 
bankruptcy but also daily court judgements implementing the law.  This will 
tend to make the loan contract more transparent and probably more painful in 
case of default.  It is worth noting that the basic laws on bankruptcy differ 
greatly between advanced countries, notably the US and the UK.  In broad 
terms the UK law is less user friendly to the borrower than the US law which 
has the Chapter 13 provisions for allowing the firm to continue as a going 
concern for a longer period than would normally be permitted by English 
receivership arrangements.  It may also be observed that because of the novelty 
of Islamic finance there may be non-uniform implementation of the bankruptcy 
laws for Islamic firms.  It is not clear how many cases of bankruptcy in Shariàh  
law are ever settled by Shariàh  courts.  It is also not clear whether the 
judgements of these courts are accepted more generally by the public and by 
non-Islamic courts. 
 
The conclusion of this section is that whether IF or non-IF is more effective in 
avoiding moral hazard would depend on the whole financial infrastructure of 
risk management systems, regulatory systems and the court systems.  If Islamic 
Financial systems end up with lower debt/equity as a whole than non-Islamic 
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systems, then the IF system is likely to be able to cushion shocks as a whole, 
but this is a question of practice, not one of theory. 
 
 
6. The Stock Market and Islamic Finance  
Islamic economists greatly favour the establishment of a stock market based on 
Islamic principles in order to further the expansion of Islamic finance.  Long 
ago Professor Metwally (1984) observed:  
 
In an Islamic economy where interest bearing loans are prohibited and where direct 
participation in business enterprise, with its attendant risks and profit sharing, is 
encouraged, the existence of a well-functioning Stock Exchange is very important. It 
would allow for the mobilization of savings for investment and provide means for 
liquidity to individual shareholders.  However, existing Stock Exchanges in non-
Islamic economies have many drawbacks.  They generate practices such as speculation 
and fluctuations in share prices which are not related to the economic performance of 
enterprises.  These practices are inconsistent with the teachings of Islam. 
 
Recently, one of the foremost scholars of Islamic finance, Professor Abbas 
Mirakhor (2011), has argued for government intervention to develop a vibrant 
and active stock market in Islamic finance countries.  He suggests  
 
.arguably, the stock market is the first-best instrument of risk-sharing.  Developing an 
active and efficient stock market can promote international as well as domestic risk-
sharing which render the economy and its financial system resilient to shocks. 
 
The stock market would thus be a useful addition to complete the Islamic 
sequence of markets to enhance economic efficiency. 
 
However the merits and demerits of stock markets have long been the subject of 
acute controversy in mainstream economics, with John Maynard Keynes (1936) 
as a leading critic of the markets.  This is a large controversial subject on which 
both authors of the present paper have written before.  Nevertheless, in the 
present context we simply note that Islamic stock markets would be very 
helpful if these could be organised to obey the Islamic precepts.  The main 
difficulty arises from the fact that since it is virtually impossible to distinguish 
between speculative and non-speculative investment strategies, it would be 
difficult to establish a stock market in which Islamic ethics and non-speculative 
strategies are followed by all players.  In our next paper, we intend to explore 
how in the real world, the conventional and Islamic stock markets could deal 
with the fundamental problems of primary fund raising for corporations and the 
price discovery/valuation of secondary market listed stocks. 
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7.  Summary of the Main Findings and Conclusion 
As this essay has ranged over several fields of conventional and Islamic 
economics, it will be useful to summarise the main theoretical and empirical 
findings.  The paper has first examined the central tenets of Islamic finance 
from the perspective of conventional economic analysis.  It started with the 
question of absolute prohibition of interest payments in any form under Islamic 
finance.  The main conclusion is that it is possible to run an efficient economic 
system of the Islamic kind, which has no interest payments, but which allows 
profits on capital and enterprise. Such a system, based totally on equity finance 
is completely viable and may, in fact, be more stable than a part-debt financed 
conventional system. 
 
The salient finding of this paper is that the best rationale for zero interest rates is 
provided by John Maynard Keynes in The General Theory. Keynes was not 
writing specifically about Islamic finance, but he did join forces with medieval 
Christian scholars and others who fundamentally objected to usury.  Keynes 
sought to rehabilitate these scholars whom the conventional economics of the 
nineteenth and twentieth century (eg. the Classical School) found to be beyond 
the pale.  He regarded high interest rates as the root cause of the problem of 
unemployment and favoured zero or low interest rates in order to achieve 
continuous full employment.  He found no evidence, or any reasonable theory 
which could show that the market system automatically generated interest rates 
which lead to full employment.  He sought to lower interest rates, and to raise 
the marginal efficiency of investment (expected profitability) to achieve this 
important objective.  The Islamic emphasis on zero interest rates and the 
combination of capital and enterprise to produce social output fits in well with 
the basic Keynesian doctrine. 
 
It is suggested however that conventional economics legitimately uses interest 
rates – zero, negative and positive rates – for its analysis of relevant economic 
conditions.  There is, however, little evidence to support the McKinnon and 
Shaw hypotheses that financial liberalisation necessarily leads to high interest 
rates which in turn generate high savings, investments and economic growth.  
The highly successful East Asian countries employed low, even negative, rates 
rather than high interest rates during their industrialisation 
. 
The paper also considers the widely used technique of cost-benefit analysis in 
conventional economics from the perspective of Islamic finance.  This involves 
the discussion of the time preference between generations and the rate of 
discount used in CBA: should it be zero or a positive number.  There are 
reasonable arguments which suggest that both these discount rates may be 
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compatible with Shariàh law.  It is however up to Shariàh scholars to determine 
the merits of this argument.  
 
As developing country policy makers are prone to use low but positive interest 
rates in order to encourage investment and growth there is, in practical terms, 
very little difference between conventional and Islamic (zero interest rate) 
paradigms in their practical applications.  The rates of return on deposits in 
conventional banks and those of profit sharing accounts in Islamic finance tend 
to be highly correlated and broadly of similar magnitude. 
 
An analysis of the second major tenet of Islamic finance, namely, its ethical 
system indicates that if human beings strictly adhere to the requirements of the 
Islamic ethics there would be few moral hazard problems in Islamic banking.  
However, since total adherence to the Islamic ethical system is unlikely for 
most individuals, important moral hazard issues, both on the side of the 
depositors in Islamic banks as well as on the side of the Islamic banks 
themselves loom large.  These would need to be resolved in the real world by 
extensive regulation.  It is a moot point whether such far reaching regulation of 
individual ethical behaviour is at all feasible or desirable. 
 
Turning to the relevant chief tenets of conventional economics we first find that 
there is no straight forward application of Modigliani and Miller theorems to 
Islamic firms and banks.  This is because the assumptions underlying these 
theorems of no transactions costs, perfect markets, no taxation and no 
bankruptcy, depart considerably from the real world situations.  If these 
assumptions are relaxed to conform more to the real world then one would get 
an optimal capital structure, i.e. some particular debt equity ratio for a specific 
firm.  However, since this is optimality from the point of view of the firm rather 
than that of the society as a whole, it will be difficult to reach the judgement 
that Islamic firms have non-optimal capital structures on the basis of Modigliani 
and Miller theorems alone. 
 
Although for MM theorems, the concept of bankruptcy is important, in the real 
world, it is its costs and who pays these which are significant factors in 
distinguishing between the two systems.  The real issues are information 
asymmetry, the principal-agent (contract) and insolvency costs, and whether or 
not, the operation of these concepts leads to a hard ‘budget’ or a soft ‘budget’ 
constraint for the borrowing firms which do not wish to pay and to shift the 
burden to the lender.  In the Islamic finance contract there is an additional 
implicit sanction against this type of moral hazard of the borrower which may 
be called ‘soft power’.  This may be in some instances more effective than the 
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‘hard power’ of the bankruptcy laws but it is difficult to imagine that it will do 
so every time or in most cases.    
The paper considers very briefly the desirability of establishing stock markets to 
further the completion of the Islamic finance programme and to help with its 
expansion. It concludes that a conventional stock market would not be useful 
for Islamic economies but a Shariàh compliant stock market without 
speculative players may be difficult to organise.  Yet, the search for an ethical 
stock market must continue. 
 
To sum up and to conclude briefly, the two systems, the Islamic and the 
conventional have existed side by side for the last two or three decades without 
any serious conflict.  The conventional system, if anything, has helped the 
development of Islamic finance.  As Islamic finance becomes stronger, there 
may be room for conflict but it is not inevitable.  Co-operation between these 
two systems is eminently desirable and feasible.  The conventional and Islamic 
finance may co-operate or even compete to produce the best outcome for 
common projects such as the provision of cheap banking for the world’s poor or 
for investment in environmental undertakings.  There are areas in widening 
access to finance which may be more desirable under Islamic finance because 
of the ethical basis of funding.  It is arguable that conventional finance, because 
of its use of debt, is likely to have a faster, but more unstable, growth than 
Islamic finance.  Thus each system has its strengths and weaknesses and one 
can easily co-exist with the other to the benefit of humankind. 
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Table I:   A Comparison between Islamic and Conventional Banking 
Source: Islamic Finance: Writing of V.Sundararajan, Eds. J.Ahmed and 
H.S.Kohli, 2011. 
Features Islamic banking Conventional banking 
Guarantee of the 
capital 
Value of: 
 
Demand deposits 
Investment deposits 
 
Rate of return on 
deposits 
 
 
 
 
Mechanism to regulate 
Final returns on 
deposits 
 
 
Profit-loss-profit (PLS) 
principle applies 
 
Use of Islamic modes 
of 
financing: 
PLS and non-PLS 
modes 
 
Use of discretion by 
banks with  
regard to collateral  
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
Uncertain, not guaranteed 
for investment deposits. 
demand deposits are 
never remunerated. 
 
Depending on bank 
performance/profits from 
investment. 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Generally not allowed to  
reduce credit risk in PLS 
modes. By way of 
exception, may be 
allowed to lessen moral 
hazard in PLS modes. 
Allowed in non-PLS 
modes. 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Certain and guaranteed. 
 
 
 
 
Irrespective of bank 
performance/profits 
from investment. 
 
No 
 
 
Not applicable. 
 
 
 
Yes, always 
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Notes 
1  The words conventional and modern economics are used interchangeably 
throughout this paper. 
 
2 Sections II and IV draw on and update the material in Singh and Hamid (1992) 
and Singh (1995).  See also Singh (1997). 
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